Danish Centre for Welfare Studies, Working Paper 2017-5, September 2017
As a sociologist working on political economy, one of the most difficult questions I encounter is how social norms, the location of actors in the class structure and the collective construction of reality, present and future, hang together. How are facts construed to fit, justify and make appear possible moral or economic practices, or economic practices defended as moral ones, and how do socially constructed factual accounts of the world reflect, preserve and produce political identities and cleavages and the prevailing interpretations of structurally based social interests? This is the classical theme of Ideologiekritik and, later, Wissenssoziologie – the interrogation of collective “ideas”, legitimacy-enhancing “narratives” and the conceptual “frames” of the common sense of the time as to the hidden impact on them of material interests growing out of the social locations of actors and the specific cognitive and moral perspectives they impose on them. (…)
In: Ash Amin/Philip Lewis (Eds.), European Union and Disunion: Reflections on European Identity, London: The British Academy, 2017, pp. 14-22.
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Saltamos.net, 10 de mayo del 2017
La elección de Emmanuel Macron es otro síntoma más de la crisis del sistema de Estados democrático-capitalista, similar a acontecimientos como Trump, el Brexit o el declive de la Eurozona. En Francia, al igual que en cualquier otro lugar, el sistema de partidos de posguerra, dominado por el centro izquierda y el centro derecha, se ha roto en añicos. Esto ha hecho posible el auge de un artista del buen rollo, un hombre de confianza de los altos mandatarios de la sociedad francesa –que simboliza juventud, optimismo y la promesa de un futuro brillante y hermoso–, un hombre procedente de la banca de inversión, que viene directamente catapultado desde los departamentos de relaciones públicas del sector financiero. (Continue)
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Review of three recent books on Germany
London Review of Books, Vol. 39, No. 9, May 2017, pp. 26-28
How could Germany of all countries have become a paragon, politically stable and economically successful, of democratic capitalism in the 1970s – ‘Modell Deutschland’ – and later, in the 2000s, Europe’s uncontested economic and political superpower? Any explanation must have recourse to a Braudelian longue durée, in which destruction can be progress – utter devastation turned into a lasting blessing – because capitalist progress is destruction, of a more or less creative sort. In 1945 unconditional surrender forced Germany, or what was left of its western part, into what Perry Anderson has called a ‘second round of capitalist transformation’ of the sort no other European country has ever had to undergo. Germany’s bout was a violent – sharp and short – push forward into social and economic ‘modernity’, driving it for ever from the halfway house of Weimar, in a painful dismantling of structures of political domination and social solidarity, feudal fetters which had held back the country’s capitalist progress and which, in locally different manifestations, continue to block capitalist rationalisation in many other European countries. (Continue on lrb.co.uk)
In: Heinrich Geiselberger (Hrsg.): Die große Regression – Eine internationale Debatte über die geistige Situation der Zeit. Suhrkamp, Berlin 2017, S. 253-274.
„Der Weg in die Zukunft, in eine neue Expansion, wie sie jedem Kapital Herzensanliegen ist, führte nach draußen: in die noch erfreulich unregierte Welt einer grenzenlosen globalen Ökonomie, in der Märkte nicht mehr in Staaten, sondern Staaten in Märkte eingeschlossen sind.“
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The Return of the Repressed
New Left Review, Vol. 104, March-April 2017, pp. 5-18.
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Inference, Vol. 3 (2017), No. 1 (for Table of Contents, see here)
Strange personalities arise in the cracks of disintegrating institutions. They are often marked by extravagant dress, inflated rhetoric, and a show of sexual power. The first Trumper of the postwar era was the Danish tax rebel, Mogens Glistrup, the founder of the nationalist Progress Party, who, having put his principles into practice, went to prison for tax evasion. Geert Wilders in the Netherlands and Boris Johnson in England are hairstyle Trumpers. Pim Fortuyn and Jörg Haider were both dandies. They died in their finery. Beppe Grillo, Nigel Farage, and Jean-Marie Le Pen, are each one third of a full Trump. (Continue reading)